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it is sometimes argued that the adverse employment effects of the minimum are
offset by increased earnings, we find virtually no earnings effect. Had the
minimum not been raised over the 1973-78 period, inflation would have greatly
moderated the adverse employment effects of the minimum, with approximately
two-thirds of the potential employment gains from elimination of the minimum
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It is often presumed that the minimum wage reduces the employment
of youth. It is also often presumed that the adverse employment effect
is moderated by a positive earnings effect. These two theoretical presump-
tions are reflected in two empirical questions: how large is the employ-
ment effect and how large is the earnings effect? The employment effect
has been the subject of considerable research, but much less attention
has been directed to the earnings effect, even though the two impacts are
integrally related. Previous analysis of employment effects have been
based largely on aggregate time series or cross section data.1 The earn-
ings effects have been neglected at least in part because traditional
methods of analysis have not allowed direct inferences about the distribu-
tion of wage rates in the absence of a minimum..., Although studies based on
aggregate data have recognized that its impact should depend on the level
of the minimum relative to the average level of wage rates, they ignore
*Thisresearch was supported by grant SES-8007165 from the National
Science Foundation. Part of the work was formulated under contract
number J-9-M-O-OO46 from the U. S. Department of Labor. We received
helpful comments from Charlie Brown and Steven Venti and from partici-
pants in the labor seminars at Columbia University and at Harvard
Uni versity.
1. Most have been based on aggregate time series data (e.g. Gramlich
[1976], Mincer [1976], and Hamerniesh [1980]) and to a lesser extent on
aggregate cross-section (e.g. Welch and Cunningham [1978], Ehrenberg and
Marcus [1979], and Cunningham [1980] data.-2-
the heterogeneity among individual market wage rates and thus also that
some individuals are much more likely than others to be affected by the
minimum. To take advantage of heterogeneity across individuals, it is
natural to consider individual market wage rates. Motivated by this
observation, we use individual employment and wage data to estimate the
effects of the minimum on the labor market experiences of youth. A natural
outcome of our procedure is joint estimation of the impacts of the minimum
on employment and on wage rates and earnings, reflecting the close rela-
tionship that indeed exists between them. Our analysis relies on individual
data for several years in the 1970s. Thus it takes advantage of the differ-
ential impacts that the minimum has on different individuals at a point in
time, as well as shifts in the minimum over time.
Our estimation procedure is based on explicit parameterization of
the effect of the minimum wage on the joint distribution of wage rate and
employment outcomes that would exist in the absence of the minimum. Thus
it emphasizes explicitly the relationship between the level of the minimum
wage and the distribution of market wage rates that individuals would
receive in the absence of the minimum. The procedure provides estimates
of a market wage function that enables us to compare expected earnings of
persons who would have been employed without a minimum with the expected
earnings of these same persons in the face of minimum wage legislation.
Both of these may be compared with the expected earnings of those who are
employed when the minimum is in effect. The procedure also allows us to
estimate the incidence of non-employment by market wage rate, with and
without a minimum. We set forth this procedure in an earlier paper (Meyer
and Wise [1981]) but based estimates only on data for one year.—3—
In this paper, we provide estimates based on several years in the
1970s. There are at least two advantages to pooling individual data for
several years. First, it provides greater variation in the level of the
minimum relative to the market distribution. A good deal of variation is
provided by shifts in this distribution due to individual and regional
differences in wage rates, given a single national minimum. Such varia-
tion is increased by shifts over time in the real minimum. This is
important because much of the power in the estimation technique derives
from differences among individuals in their market wage rates versus the
level of the minimum. Second, and possibly most important, shifts over
time in the national minimum wage allow us to estimate possible upward
shifts in the whole youth wage distribution, with increases in the mini-
mum.
1
We have proposed a basic model that we believe captures the primary
effects of the minimum as described by most researchers. In particular,
we begin by presuming that the major effect of the minimum is concentrated
on persons who would otherwise be paid below the minimum. Some youth who
in the absence of the minimum would be paid below the minimum are pre-
sumed to receive the legal minimum others because of non-coverage or
non-compliance are presumed to be paid below the legal minimum. We
explicitly parameterize these possibilities and estimate the likelihood
that each will occur. Specification to allow for these outcomes is
1.Because many macroeconomic and demographic factors affect differ-
ences over time in youth employment, however, it is possible that the best
estimates of the effects in a given year are based on data for that year
only. It is arguable that individual year estimates are more accurate than
estimates of the effects of shifts in the minimum.-4-
motivated in large part by the empirical wage distributions presented
in Section I.In addition to these possibilities, it is sometimes
argued that the minimum wage induces a bumping up effect that results
in an upward shift in the whole youth wage distribution; even persons
with market wage rates above the minimum are affected. Sometimes the
argument is put in the context of substitution of higher quality for
lower quality workers. With pooled time series cross-section data we
are able to estimate possible shifts in the overall wage distribution
with shifts in the minimum.
We estimate that if there were no minimum wage, employment among out-
of-school male youth 16 to 24 would be about 4 percent higher and employ-
ment of those 20 to 24 about 2 percent higher. Among black youth, employ-
ment increases would be greater, about 6 percent for those 16 to 24, and
10 percent for those 16 to 17. We find little effect of the minimum on
the expected earnings of youth; the higher wage rates of some youth are
about offset by the non-employment of others.
Withruit inrrpczpc ini-hgminimum rlijrinn th lQ7Ilc inf1tinn wniild '—-—.— .,. '-.... .—.. ... —.——
haveeliminated a large part of the non-employment of the minimum.If the
1973 minimum of $1 .60 had been maintained through 1978, about two-thirds
of potential employment gains with no minimum would have been achieved.
We find that the market wage rates of both white and black youth
fell relative to adult wages between 1973 and 1978. These results are
in contrast to raw data that suggest that only white youth wage rates
fell. Apparently because more low wage black than white youth are with-
out work because of the minimum, mean wage rates of those working suggest
that black wages did not fall, while in fact low-wage black youth were-5-
increasingly without work.
Graphs of wage distributions that motivate our specification are
presented in Section I.In Section II we describe our procedure. We
begin with a two-equation model that yields joint estimates of market
wage and employment equations. Under a simplifying assumption that is
not contradicted by empirical evidence, most of the estimates from the
two-equation model can also be obtained from a single-equation model
based only on the wage rates of employed persons. To understand the
approach, some readers may want to proceed directly to a description of
this simple model, without being encumbered by the more complicated two-
equation version that uses all available information on wage rates and
employment status.
Parameter estimates are shown in Section III. The estimates are
based on May Current Population Survey data for 1973, 1976, 1977, and
1978. These years included the two highest and two lowest minimum wage
levels between 1973 and 1978. Most of the results are presented in
Section IV in the form of simulations based on the estimates in Section
III. Concluding comments are in Section V.
I.Empirical Distributions of Wage Rates
Casual reasoning suggests that the impact of the minimum should be
greatest for persons who would otherwise have the lowest wages. Indeed
this is one of the presumptions underlying our analytic approach. The
graphs in Figures 1 through 6 help to demonstrate this assumption and
thus to motivate our subsequent analysis.
The figures present histograms of empirical wage distributions by
age group for 1973 and 1978. The real minimum was about 10 percent-6—
higher in 1978 than in 1973.(It was about 14 percent higher in 1976
and 4 percent higher in 1977, the other years used in our analysis.)
The histograms are broken into 25 cent intervals. For convenience there
is a break at the level of the minimum in each year. The 1973 data are
in 1978 dollars. The minimum was $2.65 in 1978 and the 1973 minimum of
$1.60 was about $2.40 in 1978 dollars. To facilitate graphing, the wage
interval .90 to 1.15 for 1978 includes all persons with wage rages below
1.15 and the 5.90 to 6.15 interval all persons with wage rates above 5.90.
Thus the apparent concentration of wage rates in these intervals must be
interpreted accordingly. A complete graph of the wage distribution
would approach zero gradually in both tails. The highest interval for
1973 also includes all persons above this interval and the lowest interval
all persons below. Figures 1, 3, and 5 pertain to 1978 and Figures 2, 4,
and 6 to 1973.
It is apparent from the graphs not only that the impact is greater
for younger than for older workers, but also that the impact was greater
in 1978 than in 1973. Relative to the central tendency of wage rates,
the minimum was higher in 1978 than in 1973. While among youth 16 to 17
the effect of the minimum is very apparent, although less so in 1973, it
is much less apparent among those 20 to 24. Indeed, among youth 20 to 24
in 1973 the discontinuity at the minimum is barely perceptible.
In short, the graphs confirm that the minimum wage impinges more on
youth who would otherwise have low wages than on those whose underlying
wage rates are higher. Additional graphs presented in Meyer and Wise
(1981), show that the impact is greater in low than in high wage areas
and also is greater among the least educated than among those with—7—
higher levels of education. Furthermore the graphs exhibit two charac-
teristics that are fundamental to our statistical specification. First,
a substantial number of youth are employed at wage rates below the
minimum. Second, there is a very substantial concentration of wage
rates at the minimum, in addition to the discontinuity at the minimum.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We shall begin by setting forth the basic assumptions of our approach.
Then we shall set forth the statistical details of a two-equation model
including both wage and employment equations. We shall then show that
if the disturbance terms in this model are uncorrelated——which is consis-
tent with our empirical findings--most of our estimates can be obtained
from a single-equation model based on observed wage rates only. The
single equation model is motivated and set forth independently in the
last part of this section. Because the single equation model is easier
to visualize, some readers may wish to read sections A and C without
giving much attention to the more complicated model described in Section
B.
A. Basic Assumptions
Consider a group of youth characterized by a vector of measured
attributes X. The elements of X include individual measures such as
education and age, as well as area specific indicators of labor market
conditions and calendar year indicators. Suppose that in the absence
of the minimum wage, some of these youth would be employed. Those
employed would receive a distribution of wage rates. We shall refer
to these employment and wage rate outcomes as market outcomes.
Now suppose that the minimum wage is set at level M. Some persons
will continue to be paid at a wage below the minimum because they work
in non—covered sectors of the economy or on jobs that are not subject
to the minimum. And indeed there may be some shifting of employment
from covered to non-covered sectors and jobs. Others may be paid belowthe minimum because of non-compliance.For whatever reason, the net
result is that some persons with an underlyingwage below the minimum
will continue to be hired at a wage below M. To allow for thispossi-
bility, we suppose that there is a probabilityP1 that persons with an
underlying wage below M will receive a wage below this level.(We have
not allowed P1 to depend on the precise value of theunderlying wage.)
We also suppose that some persons with an underlyingwage below the
minimum would after its introduction be paid at the minimum.1Although
a simple application of marginal productivity theory would imply that
persons with an underlying wage below M, would not receive M, there are
several possible explanations for such a possibility. One is that
employers may pay the minimum to persons they would otherwisepay less
than the minimum, but hire fewer or hire them for fewer hours. Whereas
without the minimum, a young person may be hired on apermanent basis
for eight hours each Saturday, if the youth must be paid theminimum,
he may be hired for fewer Saturdays to doonly those tasks at which he is
most productive. Employers may, for example, be iCSS prepared topay for
'slack time.'2
A variant of this argument, but dependent upon different types of
labor rather than different tasks, is the following:suppose that out-
put is dependent on several qualities of labor, each with a marginal
1. Welch and Cunningham [1978] impose an extreme form of this assump-
tion, that is, that all persons with market wage rates below the minimum
are paid the minimum when it is in effect.
2. Hall [1979] develops a similar point within a framework based on
the theory of employment contracts.-16-
product conditional on the employment of the others. Suppose the minimum
wage is set above the marginal product of some of the groups. Within
each of these groups, employment could be reduced until the marginal
product of those remaining is equal to the minimum and thus members of
the group are paid at M. This would result in a pile-up of wage rates at
the minimum, as exhibited in the empirical distributions of Section i.'
This possibility could lead also to some upward shifting in the marginal
products of higher quality workers and thus their wage rates as well, a
possibility that is allowed for in our empirical specification.
Another possibility is that since the minimum wage applies only to
compensation paid directly to an employee, employers can vary the level
of non-wage compensation (e.g. on-the-job training or fringe benefits)
to offset changes in direct compensation. Individuals with market wages
below the minimum may be raised to the minimum in exchange for a compar-
able reduction in on-the-job training expenditures and fringe benefits.
Individuals with market wages above the minimum will be unaffected.2
Another explanation is that employers hire at the minimum persons
who would otherwise be hired at wage rates below the minimum, but offset
this overpayment with slower wage increases--say, with age for example--
than would be observed without the minimum.3
1.This version of a possible explanation was suggested to us by
Roger Gordon.
2. See Mincer and Leighton [1980] for an analysis of the effects of
the minimum wage on investment in on-the-job training. Wessels [1980]
examines the the theoretical aspect of the minimum wage in a model that
includes fringe benefits.
3. Lazear [1980] has investigated this possibility, but did not find
much empirical support for it.-17-
In addition, employers may find it difficult to identify differ-
ences in the quality of young workers, particularly in view of the high
turnover in youth employment and the absence of an extensive employment
history.If only because of this lack of precision, employers to comply
with the legislation may raise to the minimum the wage rates of some
employees who would otherwise receive an underlying wage below M.
In reality, the explanation of the observed pattern of wage rates
is likely to reflect a combination of several plausible tendencies.
Whatever the reason, we suppose that with probabilityP2, a person with
an underlying wage below the minimum will be employed and paid the
minimum.
Finally, some persons who would otherwise be employed at market wage
rates below the minimum are without work after its introduction. They are
neither employed below M (which occurs with probability P1) nor at M (which
occurs with probability P2). The probability of being without work because




We believe that the major effects of the minimum are concentrated on
persons with sub-minimum market wage rates, and indeed this presumption is
consistent with the primary postulated effects of the minimum.' Nonethe-
less, some of the explanations given above are consistent with some effect
on the pay of youth with higher market wage rates. Other forms of labor
1. We have not allowed P1 or P9 to depend--for persons with marketwage
rates below M--on the differenáe between the market wage and the minimum,
although in principle we think that they would. We believe, however, that our
estimates of P and P2 are good estimates of the average values that would be
obtained if sobewhat more realistic assumptions were incorporated in our
statistical analysis. Indeed, this conclusion is supported by estimates
obtained by dividing the market distribution below the minimum into two inter-
vals and estimating P1 and P2 values for each interval.-18-
substitution arguments also could lead to an increase in wages of youth
with market rates above the minimum. Sometimes it is argued that institu-
tional hierarchical wage structures together with a minimum may lead to a
general bumping up of the wage distribution. We allow calendar year shifts
in the wage distribution to capture such shifts with changes in the level
of the minimum.1
B. A General Two-Equation Model
We shall base our estimates on data from the May Current Population
Surveys for 1973, 1976, 1977, and 1978. For our analysis, it is important
to have accurate hourly wage rate data. In particular, we would like to
observe a true picture of the distribution of wage rates around the mini-
mum. Some respondents are not employed, however, and thus do not report
a wage rate.In addition, a substantial fraction of those who are employed
do not report hourly wage rates.2 In a random sample of 5000 out-of-
school young men 16 to 24, the distribution by employment status and
reported versus not reported hourly wage is as follows:
1. A large proportion of these are salaried. About 90 percent of




Wage Rate Known 58.8
Wage Rate Unknown 41 .2
We shall show below that estimates can be based only on employed youth
with reported wage rates, and indeed many of our simulations derive
from such estimates. It is clear, however, that the data contain consider-
able information on observed employment status that is not used if this
approach is followed. But to use all the data, our statistical speci-
fication must reflect not only the presumed structural effect of the
minimum wage, but must also reflect the unknown wage rates of some of
those who are employed. We proceed as follows:
Consider again a group of individuals with measured attributes X.
Suppose that in the absence of a minimum wage, employment and wage rela-
tionships in a given year would be of the form
E =Xo.+ El
(1) W X + E2
R E probability of a
reported hourly waqe.
Employment is denoted by the unobserved index variable E with the property
that an individual is employed if E > 0, W is the wage rate, c andare





Note that E and W are specified in reduced form. Given X, R is assumed
to be uncorrelated with E and W, although R could in principle depend on
X and need not be the same for each person with observed attributesX.









where and dt are year-specific shifts in the underlying employment and
wage relationships, and W. is the real wage rate in year t.The t and dt
are intended to capture shifts due to changes in the real minimum from one
year to the next. For example, as discussed above, an upward shift in
the minimum may result in an overall upward movement in thewage rates of
all youth, in addition to the effect on those with sub-minimum marketwages.
In practice, we are not able to distinguish the effect of the minimumon the
year specific shifts from the effect of other aggregate changes in the
economy, like demographic trends. We shall argue below, however, that the
estimated values are not consistent with a general upward shift inwage
rates because of increases in the real minimum. To simplify exposition,
we shall repress for now the subscript t, as well as the year-specific
1.The substantive assumption is that given X, the random component
of R is not correlated with or s2.-21-
terms, proceeding with the implicit understanding thatthey are incorpor—
ated in the vector X.
For expository purposes we shallpause for a moment and consider a
diagram that relates the values of E, W, and R to thepossible outcomes
in the presence of a minimumwage, as shown in Figure 7. The entries within
the diagram pertain to outcomes with a minimumwage. The notation on the
top and bottom outside margins of the diagram pertain tounderlying values
of the employment and wage variables, On theright outside margin is
indicated whether, among persons who would beemployed in the absence of
a minimum, a wage would be reported. The single-linedarea indicates the
proportion of the group who would not be employed witha minimum wage.
Those with E <0would not be employed without the minimum and added to
this group are those with W <Mwho are not employed with a minimum--the
two areas indicated by 1 -
P1
-














a reported wage and others would not. We observe hourly wage rates for
persons schematically included in the crossed area.(This is the group
used in the procedure to be described in Section C below. From this group
we can also estimate P1 and P2.) The remaining group we observe to be
employed but we don't observe their wage rates. Our goal then is to
describe the probabilities of the possible outcomes.
To do this we assume that E and W (a transformation of the wage rate)
are distributed bivariate normal. To facilitate computation--and we
believe without appreciably altering the results--we suppose, as noted
above, that the unmeasured determinants of the underlying employment and
wage equations on the one hand and the unmeasured determinants of whether
a wage is reported on the other, are not correlated. This allows us to
proceed with a bivariate instead of a trivariatedistribution.1For ease
of exposition we have only specified two relationships in equation (5).
We might more formally have added a third, say S =X3 -1- wherean
employed worker has an observed wage if S >0.If is uncorrelated
with and £2. however, expressions like Pr(E >0,W =w,S >0)can
be written as Pr(E >0,W =w)Pr(S>0).Our assumptions lead to
expressions like these and rather than carry the third equation through-
out the analysis, we have suppressed it, simply letting R indicate the
probability of a reported hourly wage. (Extensions of this reasoning
demonstrates also that if Eland£2 areuncorrelated, then consistent
estimates of P1 and P2 and the parameters of the market wage function
1.We shall not explain this in detail but without this assumption,
the development would proceed much as we have laid it out except that we
would have to evaluate trivariate integrals in some instances.-23-
are obtained by the procedure to be described in Section C. We shall
return to this.)
If we consider all persons in the CPS survey, there are five possi-
ble observed outcomes, corresponding to the schematic diagram in Figure 7:
(i) Not employed,
(ii) Employed with a wage w less than P1,
(3) (iii) Employed with a wage w equal to M,
(iv) Employed with a wage w greater than M,
(v) Employed without a reported wage.





Then if frepresentsthe density of W, ifis a
standard normal density function, and ifand are standard normal
univariate and bivariate distribution functions respectively, the proba-
bilities of the possible outcomes are as follows:
(i)Pr[Not employed]
= Pr[E < 0]
+ Pr[E > 0 and W < M](l-
P1 - P2)




- - P2) =Pr(l)
(4) (ii) Pr[Employed with a wage w less than N]
= Pr[E > 0, W = w].P1R
= Pr[E > 0W = w]f(W).P1R
= [X+ (p/)(w-X)1 1(w_-_X\. R= Pr(2)R
I 2 jl
L (1 — ) -'
1.In preliminary estimates we experimented with wider intervals to test
the sensitivity of our model to this range. Within a moderate range around
M, our results are not appreciably affected by the size of the interval.-24-





























-M-X .(l -R) =Pr(5).(l-R)
We see from (i) that the probability that an individual is not employed
is given by the probability of not being employed without the minimum,
Pr[E <0];plus the probability that without the minimum he would be
employed at a wage below M, times the probability that he is not employed




a person is employed with a wage W less than M is given by the probability
of being employed without the minimum, with wage rate W =w,Pr[E >0,—25—
W =w],times the probability of being employed below M in the presence
of the minimum, P1, times the probability R of reporting a wage rate.
Similar explanations pertain to the remaining expressions.
The log-likelihood function for N observations is then given by
N1 N2 N5
(5)










where i indexes individuals and N1 +
N2
+... + N5N. Thus as long
as R does not depend on parameters that enter elsewhere in the likelihood
function, it may be disregarded in estimation. Equation (5) is maximized
with respect to a, ,c,P1. P2. and p.
Now suppose that, given X, E and W are uncorreiated so that p =0.







(ii) Pr[Employed with a wage w less than M]










(6) (iv) Pr[Employed with a wage w greater than M
=






The probability of having an observed wage is equal to 1 -(i)
-(v),
which is given by













The distribution of the observed wage rates, conditional on observing
a wage, can be derived by dividing equations (6, ii), (6, iii), and (6, iv),





(8) h(w) =+ P2.[M1-x)/]
if <w<
f(w) f M <W
D 2
From this expression, we can form a likelihood function and estimate
,andci.Thus, given our assumptions, consistent estimates can be-27-
obtained from the single equation model if p =0.
But in this model, a zero correlation does not mean that employment
and wage equations can be estimated separately with no loss of information.
Estimation of the two equations jointly provides information that cannot
be duplicated by estimating each separately. Indeed a market employment
equation cannot be estimated without considering a wage function as well.
There is no employment equation analogous to the conditional wage function
that does not depend on the wage function. And estimating the two equa-
tions jointly provides additional information on wage rates, even with
a zero correlation. As usual, the use of more information constrains
the parameter estimates to reflect more empirical fact and to this extent
provides better estimates, but in this case the information does not
'separate' as might be expected on the basis of experience with more
standard models.1
C. A Direct Specification of the Single—Equation Model
We find empirically that indeed the correlation between the distur-
bance terms in the employment and wage equations is not significantly
different from zero. Thus because of computational ease we shall present
1.Suppose, however, that the probability of w <Nwere known and that
E1-
P1
-P.Then the probabilities of employment and non-employment





the likelihood function formed from these terms could be used to estimate
a in E =Xa+ ,togetherwith the non-employment parameter P. From
this perspective, other single employment equation formulation of the
effect of the minimum can be thought of as incorporating the term
Pr[E >0]•Pr[W<M].Pin an ad hoc way by including M ÷ (an average wage)
as one of the X variables.-28-
a substantial number of results based on the single equation model. For
expository purposes, we shall also present in this section a direct deri-
vation of this specification.
Again, consider a group of youth characterized by a vector of
measured attributes X.Suppose that in the absence of a minimum wage,
the distribution in the population of wages paid to employed persons
with attributes X would be described by the density function f(W), the
"underlying' or market distribution of wages. Graphically, think of it









Recall the discussion in Section A above and suppose that the minimum is
set at level N. Persons with an underlying wage below N, and who would
have been employed without a minimum, in the presence of the minimum will
receive a wage below this level with probability P1. Also, for the reasons
set forth above, with probability P2. a person with an underlying wage
below the minimum will be employed and paid the minimum. Those with
market wage rates below ri who are not hired at or below the minimum are




These ideas can be described more formally as follows. Suppose that
the expected underlying wage of individuals with measured personal and
regional attributes x is given by X13 and that the variance ofwage rates
among persons with characteristics X is cr2. This gives rise to a wage
distribution f(W) like that shown in Figure 8.That is,
(9)
where c is a disturbance term with variance c2.
With a minimum wage M, wage rates may be distributed as represented
graphically by the dotted function in Figure 8. The form of this
function depends on the values ofP1 and P2. For example, if P2 were
zero, there would be no oile-up of wages at M, only a jump in the density
function at M.If both P1 and P2 were zero, the density function would
be truncated at M.





(10) h(w) = f <W <
f(w) if £12W
0
where D =1-[(M1-Xi3)/c](l-P1-P2),and M is again a one cent interval-30-
from M1 to M2. This formulation is identical to equation (8) in Section
B.1It may be arrived at by assuming that a random sample is drawn from
the underlying distribution of market wage rates. Then, of the values
below M, some are set to M (with probability P2), while others are




Then h(w) is the distribution
of observed wage rates in terms of the underlying distribution f. The
denominator D may be thought of as a normalizing factor assuring that the
density function integrates to 1.2 One can also think of h(w) as the
conditional distribution of wages, given that a wage is observed. The
other elements of the function may be explained in the following way.
A value of w <Mwill be observed with likelihood P1 times the likelihood
of an underlying wage W =w.The likelihood of an observed wage at the
minimum (1 cent interval) is equal to the likelihood of an underlying wage
at the minimum, plus the probability that the underlying wage is below the
minimum, but is raised to the minimum. Observed wage rates above the
1. Following standard practice, the log of wages is used as the depen-
dent variable in our wage model. Since our results are likely to be sensi-
tive to this distributional assumption, we have also experimented with other
transformations of wages, in particular the Box-Cox transformation:
if A0
if A =0
As expected we find that the predicted unemployment from tñe minimum wage
is least when wages are assumed to be log normal (i.e., A =0)and great-
est when nominal wages are assumed to be normally distributed (i.e., A =1).
2.It is the probability that an individual who would have an observed
wage rate in the absence of the minimum will also have one after the intro-
duction of the minimum. Or it is the probability that a person who is
employed without the minimum will also be employed with the minimum.
A-31-
minimum follow the distribution of the underlying wage, except that a
larger proportion of observed than of underlying wages may be above the
minimum, as indicated by the denominator D.
Suppose that among N persons with observed wage rates, N1 are below
M, N2 are "at M and, N3 are above M. For these N persons indexed by i,
the log-likelihood of the realized observations would be
N1 N2 N3
(11) L = in h(w.) + in h(w) + in h(w),
i=l
'i=l i=i
with the specification of h(w) for each group taken from equation (3).
This function is maximized with respect to F, G,
P1and P2.
Strictly speaking, the results of this model should be interpreted
as pertaining only to hourly wage employees. In practice, however, the
results based on this model do not differ substantially from those based
on the two equation model, that is based on data for all persons, includ-
ing both hourly and salaried youth.III. Parameter Estimates
We shall first describe the variables used in the analysis. Then
estimates based on the single equation model are presented, followed by
estimates based on the two-equation specification.
A. The Variables
The variables used in the estimation are defined as follows:
Age: Age in years.
School :Number of years of school completed.
Race: Equal to 1 for blacks and zero otherwise.
Never Married: Equal to 1 if the person has never married
and zero if married, widowed, or divorced.
Area Wage: The average wage of adult manufacturing workers
in the SMSA or state in which the person lives, usually
entered as the logarithm of area wage.
Area Unemployment: The adult unemployment rate in the SMSA
or state in which the person lives.
Wage: The logarithm of the hourly wage rate.
Employment: An indicator variable equal to 1 if the individ-
ual is employed or zero otherwise.
Youth Differential :Dichotomous calendar year variables for
1976, 1977, and 1978.
Only the youth differential variables require explanation. We assume
that youth wages increase over time with the adult wage indexat, but may
deviate from this index in year t according to the multiplier dt. Then-33—




in WktXktl +lnat +indt +£2
The adult index at we know from published data and thus it may be subtracted
from the left-hand side of the equation; the dt must be estimated. Alterna-
tively, at can be thought of as a wage deflator with estimation of the real
wage equation
(13) in (Wkt/at) =Xktl
+indt +E2
The results are virtually invariant to the use of an adult wage index or
the Consumer Price Index for a.1 To estimate the dt. we have entered
calendar year indicator variables for 1976 through 1978.
These variables pick up shifts in the distribution of youth wage
4--.- 4-- -.A.,13- ,., --C .-I1 OVer LilliC, ECILIVC LU QUUI 1. W9C 1aLe. LLIIIIc1Le UI LJtIII WI II
reflectoverall movement in youth wages resulting from changes in the
minimum wage, but they also reflect other determinants of youth wage rates
relative to adult rates, like the relative numbers of young and older
persons. We shall argue below, however, that the estimates themselves
together with trends in the real minimum wage are inconsistent with an
important upward shift in the distribution of youth wage rates with
1. The results reported in the paper are based on an index calculated
from area wage data. Virtually the same results are obtained using the
Consumer Price Index.-34-
increases in the minimum.'
B.Single Equation Estimates
We shall first present pooled estimates by age group and then by race.
Most of our simulation results are based on these estimates. We shall then
present estimates based only on 1973 data and estimates based only on 1978
data and shall also discuss the "fit" of the model for 1978.
1. Pooled Years Parameter Estimates by Age Group
Parameter estimates based on the data from four years pooled together
are shown in Table 1, by age group.
Consider first the estimates of P1 and P2 for out-of-school young men
16 to 24. The estimates indicate that during the period 1973 to 1978
approximately 37 percent of youth who otherwise would have been employed
at market wage rates below the minimum are still employed below the
legislated minimum. Another 36 percent of those with market sub-minimum
wages are employed at the minimum. Approximately 27 percent (l-.374-.357)
of this group are without work because of the minimum.
The youngest sub-minimum group are the most likely to be employed
below the minimum; the oldest are the least likely to be employed below
this level. Whereas 49 percent of 16 to 17 year olds who otherwise would
be employed below the minimum are still employed below M, only 33 percent
of the subminimum workers in the 20 to 24 age group are employed below the
1.If there were such a shift, we could think of an upward shift in
the wage distribution with the minimum imposed on this shifted distribu-
tion. Then our calculated employment effects reflect the estimated employ-
ment effect on those whose market wage rates are still below the minimum.
Our estimates would not capture the negative employment effect of such an
overall increase in youth wages.-35-
Table1 :Parameter Estimates for Out-of-School
MaleYouth, Pooled Years, by Age Groupa
Variable
Age Group
16-24 20-24 16-19 16-17
Age 0.062 0.041 0.107 0.053
(16.283) (8.434) (13.224) (2.114)
School 0.022 0.019 0.027 0.009
(6.582) (6.128) (6.447) (1.148)
Black -0.062 -0.067 -0.103 -0.058
(2.754) (3.187) (4.564) (1.553)
Never Married -0.156 -0.172 -0.134 -0.089
(10.249) (12.188) (6.720) (1.559)
Log Area Wage 0.566 0.586 0.302 0.119
(12.570) (13.325) (7.630) (1.721)
Area Unemployment -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.010
(1.160) (1.537) (0.732) (1.423)
Youth Differential:
1976 -0.047 -0.046 -0.077 -0.028
(1.921) (1.814) (3.371) (0.623)
1977 -0.051 -0.027 -0.122 -0.082
(2.337) (1.192) (6.036) (2.294)
1978 -0.021 -0.031 -0.088 -0.107
(1.023) (1.508) (4.474) (2.919)
Constant —0.399 -0.105 -1.255 —0.213
(4.800) (0.948) (9.051) (0.497)
P1 0.374 0.334 0.397 0.490
(9.136) (7.064) (12.421) (8.881)
P2 0.358 0.391 0.367 0.341
(8.502) (7.338) (11.039) (7.335)
0.345 0.347 0.321 0.297
(70.375) (71.085) (82.414) (65.001)
N 3000 3000 3000 921
aT—Statistics are in parenthesis.-36-
minimum. The estimated proportion raised to the minimum (the P2 values)
do not differ a great deal by age group although P2 is highest for those
20 to 24 (.39) and lowest for the 16 to 17 group (.34). The percentage
employment effects implied by these values depend not only on their
magnitudes but on the proportion of sub-minimum workers in each age group.
The simulations presented below reflect both of these factors. The absolute
employment effects depend in addition on the number of workers in the
age group.
The remaining parameter estimates on the variables X all have the
expected signs, but some of the magnitudes are of interest. Youth wage
rates vary across regions with adult wages but less than in proportion
to the wages of older workers. For all youth, a one percent increase in
adult wages is associated with a .56 percent increase in youth wages.
For 16 to 17 year olds the elasticity is close to zero (.12).
The estimated youth differentials indicate that the market wage rates
of young workers fell relative to the wage rates of older workers between
1973 and 1978. In particular, this is true for the youngest age groups,
as indicated by the following tabulation. In part at least, these declines
reflect the
Tabulation 1.Youth Differentials by /\ge
Group (see Table 1)
16-24 20-24 16-19 16-17
1976 —4.7 -4.6 -7.7 -2.8
1977 —5.1 -2.7 -12.2 -8.2
1978 —2.1 -3.1 -7.7 —10.7
relatively larger proportion of youth in the labor market. In direction,-37-
they are not unlike the relationships between average observed wage rates
for young versus older employed workers. These estimates, however, are
corrected for the truncation effects of the minimum. That is, a substan-
tial number of low-wage workers are without work and thus have no observed
wage rate and are not included in the averages of surveyed workers.
Market wage rates fell faster than the uncorrected survey results would
suggest. This is especially true for black youth. (We shall return below
to separate estimates by race.)
Although it is not possible to distinguish shifts in the wage distri-
bution due to the minimum from shifts due to other causes, such as the
increase in the relative number of youth, the year effects appear to be
inconsistent with the possibility that increases in the minimum result in
noticeable overall upward shifts in the market wage distribution of youth.
The real minimum, relative to the 1973 minimum, together with the esti-
mated youth differentials for each year are shown below in tabular and
in graphical form.






1978 +10.0 -2.1Youth Differential Versus
the Real Minimum
Whereas the real minimum was higher in each of the years 1976 to 1978 than
it was in 1973, youth wage rates were lower relative to adult wage rates
in each of these years. In addition, there is no systematic relation-
ship between the real minimum and the youth differential. To be a bit
more systematic we could think of the youth differential as being a
function of a time trend, possibly due to demographic effects, and the
minimum. Then we could graph the youth differential against calendar year
and "fit" a line to these points. Even this formulation does not yield
residuals from the time trend that are high when the minimum is high and
vice versa.1 Of course, we only have the information for four years and
1. Although we have mentioned the possibility that youth wage rates
were falling over this period because of the increasing number of young
persons in the labor force, we believe that this explanation is not a
powerful one. The proportion of youth in the population rose only about
1 percentage point between 1971 and 1980, whereas during the previous
decade the percent of youth in the population increased from 12 to 16.
-38-
Youth Wage Differential









additional data could reveal a relationship. The weight of this evidence,
however, does not point to a general increase in all youth wage rates with
increases in the minimum. We do not observe a general bumping up effect.
Thus in the simulations below we have assumed that changes in the minimum
do not lead to shifts in the whole wage distribution but we do allow for
the estimated shifts in youth market wage rates over time.
2.Pooled Years Parameter Estimates by Race
Estimates for out-of-school youth 16 to 24 are shown in Table 2 by
race. The estimated P1 value for whites is virtually the same as for
blacks (.364 versus .358), with the estimatedP2 value for whites some-
what lower than for blacks (.354 versus .400). ccording to these esti-
mates, 28 percent of whites who would otherwise be employed are without
work because of the minimum, while 24 percent of sub-minimum blacksare
without work for this reason. Thus effects of the minimum fora sub-
minimum black are not much different than for a sub-minimum white. But
a larger proportion of blacks than whites have submininium marketwage
rates and thus the employment effect is proportionately greater for blacks
than for whites, as shown below.
The estimates also indicate that youth marketwage rates for both
blacks and whites were falling over the period, relative to adultwages.
The youth differentials by race are shown below.-40-
Table 2 :Parameter Estimates for Out-of-School








Never Married -0.157 -0.152
(-10.413) (-6.361)
Log Area Wage 0.567 0.596
(12.424) (10.297)




















a T-statisticsare in parenthesis.—41—
Tabulation 3. Youth Differentials byRace, Based
on Separate Estimates for Whites





These estimates are in contrast to average wage rates that show declining
wages for white youth, but not for blacks.1 As mentioned above, our
estimates correct for the minimum wage disemployment effects that affect
blacks to a relatively greater extent than whites. Because the minimum
reduces the employment of low wage workers, it also tends to makeobserved
average wage rates higher than they would be without the minimum. In
presenting market estimates, our results correct for this effect.In
addition, our estimates control for the individual attributes listed in
the tables, in particular age and schooling.
The remaining parameter estimates except schooling do not differ sub-
stantially by race. The black estimated schooling coefficient, however,
is 60 percent higher than the estimate for whites (.035 versus .022).
These estimates are consistent with higher rates of return to college edu-
cation for blacks than for whites, as found by Freeman [1976]. But these
estimates are not limited to college versus high school education, they
reflect average returns over all observed levels.
3.1973 Versus 1978
Parameter estimates for 1973 and for 1978 are shown in Table 3. The
1.See Freeman and Wise [1979] for wage rates of youth relative to
adults for 1967 and 1977.-42-
Table3:Parameter Estimates for Out-of-School














Area Wage 0.128 0.084
(12.243) (10.773)












a T-statisticsare in parenthesis.
bThis variable was not available for 1973.-43-
estimatedcoefficients for 1973 are very close to those for 1978. Al-
though the estimates for P1 and P2 do differ between the years, their
sums are quite similar---.56 in 1973 and .68 in 1978. Thus the likelihood
that youth with market wage rates below the minimum are out of work because
of the minimum (1 -
P1
-
P2)is by these estimates .44 in 1973 and .32 in
1978.
Recall that we have not allowed P1 and P2 to depend on the difference
between the market wage rates and the minimum. We believe, however, that
persons with market wage rates below but close to the minimum are more
likely than those with lower market wage rates to receive the minimum.
If the minimum is nearer the tail of the distribution, a relatively small
proportion of those below it will have market wage rates close to the
minimum. This could explain a lower proportion of those with sub-minimum
market wage rates receiving the minimum in 1973 than in 1978.It could
also explain the higher value of P1 in 1973 than in 1978, indicating that
a larger proportion of those with market wage rates below the minimum
continued to be hired below M in 1973 than in 1978.1 Nonetheless, we shall
base most of our simulations on a model with P1 and P2 the same for all
years. Although this may not be accurate for any individual year, we
believe that our estimates provide good average values and thus realistic
average employment effects.
The pooled data of course allow us to observe different portions of
the underlying market wage distribution, depending on the level of the
1.In addition, the coverage of the minimum wage legislation was
increased somewhat between 1973 and 1978 (in 1974) and this would have
reduced somewhat the likelihood of employment below the minimum.-44-
minimum in a given year. Combining these observations we believe provides
more accurate estimates for the time period than those provided by data
for any single year. As mentioned above, however, it may be that employ-
ment effects for a single year are most accurately obtained from data
based on that year only. For purposes of comparison, we shall present
below simulations based on the various model estimates.In general, the
results are quite similar.
4. The Model Fit
Unlike most more traditional methods of analysis, the distributional
assumptions play a key role in our work. It has become standard practice
to assume that wage functions are log-normal, and the results reported
above are based on a log-normal distribution as well. However, to check
the sensitivity of our results to this assumption and to determine a
"best' fit, we also experimented with other distributions, using a Box-
Cox transformation of wage rates.1
A comparison of the 1978 empirical distribution of wage rates by
interval for out-of-school male youth 16 to 24 versus the predicted
distribution based on the log-normal wage distribution is shown in Figure
9.It appears from the graph that the fit is quite close, especially at
the tails where alternative distributions are likely to give different
results. Thus if we can fit the tails in particular, we have added con-
fidence in our results. The actual percentages below the minimum, at the
minimum (interval), and above $5.90 are 4.9, 15.6, and 21.1 respectively;
the predicted percentages are 5.0, 16.1, and 18.8. No continuous distribu-












































































































































tiori, of course, can capture precisely the pile-up of wagerates at
"magnet" values like $3.00, $4.00, or $5.00.
A somewhat more formal way to measure the fit is to calculate a
chi-square statistic based on the differences betweenthe empirical and
predicted frequencies within the intervals. Thestatistic:
U (n. -
j=l n
(where n. is the number of observations in theth interval, and U is the
number of intervals) has a chi-square distributionwith N-(J -1+K)
degrees of freedom, where K is the numberof parameters estimated in our
model. Among a wide range of distributions that wetried, the log-normal
gives the smallest chi-square value. Itis very much smaller than the
chi-square value based on the assumption ofnormality for example (286.1
versus 548.7).* Although we have not madeformal tests for each year, we
have used the log-normal throughout.
C. Two-Equation Estimates
Estimates based on the two-equation model described in Section lI-B
are shown in Table 4. The estimated P1 and P2 values are veryclose to
the single-equation estimates shown in Table 2 for the 16 to 24 age group.
The wage equationparameters are also very close to the single equation
estimates. The estimated value of p, the correlation between the distur-
1.This section has been reproduced from Meyer and Wise [1981].
2. We could have allowed the distribution to vary from sample to
sample, but we concluded that the complexities inherent in such a pro-
cedure would not be offset by appreciably improved estimates.-47-
Table4 :Two-Equation Estimates for Out-of-School












Never Married -0.140 -0.464
(5.765) (6.943)
Log Area Wage 0.609 -0.779
(10.244) (3.293)





















T-statistics are in parenthesis.-48-
bance terms in the market wage and employment equations, is not signif-
icantly different from zero.'
The market employment equation estimates reveal two unexpected
results.First, once we correct for schooling, race, and marital status
(as well as the regional and calendar year variables) there is no rela-
tionship between age and the probability of employment. This is in
contrast to much tabular employment data that shows a substantial rela-
tionship between age and employment. According to our results, however,
this is a spurious result reflecting schooling and, in particular, marital
status. Evaluated at the mean of other variables, our results indicate
that married youth are about .11 more likely to be employed than single
young men, and that a year of schooling increases thelikelihood of
employment by about .03. Controlling for other variables black youth are
about .16 less likely to be employed than white youth. Although it is
plausible that wage rates and employment status affect marriage decisions,
we believe that the estimates reflect at least a strong relationship
between marital status and cost of non-employment, or conversely, between
marital status and the value of income. There is likely to be a causal
relationship between marital status and the desire for employment and
higher paying jobs.
Second, the market probability of employment increased somewhat
1.The estimated value is negative. Because it is estimated very
imprecisely, it may not be appropriate to rationalize it. However, our
estimates control for marital status which is not common among other
estimates of employment and wage equations. Since marital status has a
positive effect on both the wage and employment equations, its exclusion
would tend to induce a positive correlation between the disturbance terms.-49-
between 1973 and 1978 according to the calendar year differentials,
while youth market wage rates were falling relative to adult wages. This
would suggest, for example, that if demographic trends tended to reduce
the youth employment ratio, they were more than offset by falling youth
wage rates. Without the minimum, youth would have been 2.3 percent more
likely to be employed in 1976 than in 1973, 3.9 percent more likely in
1977, and 4.3 percent more likely in 1978.1 These estimates of course
control for adult area unemployment rates.
1.The estimates represent the derivative of the probability of
employment with respect to the calendar year indicator variables, evaluated
at the mean of the other variables.-50-
IV. SimulatedEmployment and Wage Effects of the Minimum
We shall first present results based on the single—equation model
and then some results based on the two-equation model that cannot be
inferred from the single-equation parameter estimates only. The simula-
tion results were obtained by calculating appropriate employment and
wage rate values for each person in our sample and then summing over
all youth.'
A. Simulations Based on the Single-Equation Model
Simulated employment and wage effects of the minimum based on the










1.Details are provided in the appendix to Meyer and Wise [1981].
Tabulation 3.Simulated Employment and Wage
Effects by Age Group Based on


















According to these estimates, without the minimum, employment of out-
of-school male youth would have been 3.9 percent higher over these years
than it was. It would have been 8.7 percent higher for 16 to 17 year olds,
but only 2.2 percent higher for those 20 to 24.
Expected earnings of youth were not affected much by the minimum.
Without the minimum, the expected market wage would have been $2.68.In
the presence of the minimum, the expected wage of this group, that would
have been employed without the minimum, was $2.67. While the expected
wage conditional on employment was higher than the market expected wage
($2.78 versus $2.68), this increase was just offset by the zero earnings
of those without work because of the minimum.
On the one hand, it can be argued that the minimum has not hurt youth
because their expected earnings are not affected much by it. On the other
hand, youth who are not employed lose current income and more importantly
will have lower incomes in the future because of non-employment in early
years. Wage increases come in large part with work experience.1Indeed,
if the minimum prevents some youth from gaining work experience, it may
prolong non-employment by prolonging the length of time that their market
wage is below the minimum. We are implicitly assuming in making these
arguments that at the margin leisure is not valued much by a youth with
no employment.
We observe that the averaqe market wage rate of youth 16to 17 ws l.7.
The real minimums over these four years were $1.60, $1.82, $1.66, and
$1 .76 in 1973, 1976, 1977, and 1978 respectively. Thus the minimum was
1. See for example Ellwood [] andMeyer and Wise [].—52-
set on average very close to the central tendency of the market wage dis-
tribution for these youth. It is thus not surprising to observe a
relatively large dis-employment effect for this group.
For comparison we have also obtained analogous employment and wage
estimates based on separate estimates for 1973 and for 1978 (see Table 3).
They are as follows:
Tabulation 4.Simulated Employment and Wage Effects
Based on Separate Estimates for
1973 and 1973 (See Table 3)
1973 1978
Percent Increase in 4.0 6.8
Employment if No
Minimum
Expected Market Wage 2.77 3.87
Expected Wage With 2.75 3.78
Minimum
Expected Wage With 2.87 4.14
Minimum Conditional
on Employment
The results are in order of magnitude commensurate for those based on
the pooled data.In both years, however, these estimates indicate a
slight decline in expected wage rates with the minimum, versus market
wage rates without the minimum.(The estimates are in current year
dollars.) We also find a larger employment effect in 1978 than in 1973.
The real minimum was 10 percent higher in 1978.
One check on the distributional assumptions of our model is to predict
the potential employment gain in 1973, based on estimates derived from
1978 data. This provides some confirmation of the specification because-53-
the 1978 data exhibits a relative absence of observations just below the
1978 minimum, and thus there is no way to observe the assumed market
distribution in this range. The 1973 data, however, included observations
in this range because the minimum was lower. Thus for 1973, one canargue
it is possible to observe a part of the market distribution that was not
observable in 1978. Thus if both sets of data lead to the same con-
clusions, we have greater confidence in our distributional assumptions.
Based on 1978 data and parameter estimates, we estimate that the dis-
employment effect of the 1973 minimum was about 4.3 percent, very close to
the 4 percent figure based on 1973 data and parameter estimates. The
match is improved if we take account of the shift in the marketwage
distribution between 1973 and 1978, as exhibited in the pooledyears
estimates.
To show the moderating effect of inflation on the employment effects
of a fixed minimum, we calculated the percent increase inemployment that
would have resulted had the minimum been held at its 1973 valuethrough-
out the period. These results are shown in the second row of the tabula-
tion below. For comparison, we have also included the effect ofno mini-
Tabulation 5. Simulated Employment Effects by Age Group,
Based on Pooled Years Model (See Table 2)
16-24 20-24 16-19 16-17
Percent Increase in 3.9 2.2 7.1 8.7
Employment if No
Minimum




Percent Increase in 3.0 1.8 5.2 6.2
Employment if Minimum
Had Been $1.25-54-
mum,reproduced from the first tabulation above, and the percent increase
in employment had there been a $1.25 minimum throughout the period.If
the minimum had been maintained at its 1973 level, inflation would have
led to youth employment increases equal to about two-thirds of the poten-
tial increase in employment that could have been achieved by elimination
of the minimum. A $1.25 minimum would gain about 80 percent of the
potential increase in employment if there were no minimum, according to
our estimates.
Simulated employment effects by race and age based on the pooled
years model are as follows:
Tabulation 6. Simulated Employment Effects by Race
and Age Based on Pooled Years Model
(See Table 1)
Age GrouR Total White Black
16-24 3.9 3.7 5.6
20-24 2.2 2.1 3.5
16-19 7.1 6.9 10.1
16-17 8.7 8.6 10.1
The precent increase in employment if there were no minimum is higher for
blacks than for whites in each age group. For youth 16 to 24, the effect
for blacks is 50 percent higher than the effect for whites. Since the
estimated values of P1 and P2 are about the same for blacks as for whites,
this result is due to the greater proportion of blacks with attributes
associated with low wage rates. The effect for the youngest age group is
only17 percent higher for blacks than for whites. Thus these results imply
that the differences in the attributes of black and white high school—55—
dropouts are relatively small compared to the difference in the attributes
of older blacks and whites. Among youth 20 to 24, the black effect is 67
percent higher than the effect on whites, Apparently this is not the
result of a difference by age group in the race effect, sinceaccording
to the estimates in Table 2, the race effect is only slightly higher for
the 20 to 24 age group than for the 16 to 17group.
Again, for comparison we also calculated employment effects by race
for 16 to 24 year olds, based on separate estimates by race. Theyare:
Tabulation 7. Simulated Employment Effectsby Race,
Based on Pooled Years Model Estimated
Separately for Whites and Blacks 16
to 24 (see Table 2)
te Black
3.9 5.3
These estimates are very close to those based on the pooledyears model
(Tabulation 6) that does not estimate separate parameters for blacks
and whites, other than an additive race effect. Again, because the
black market wage distribution is lower than the white distribution,
the part of the market distribution not observed because of the minimum
is different for blacks and whites. Thus these results alsohelp to
support our distributional assumptions.
B.Simulations Based on the Two-Equation Model
Selected simulated employment effects based on the two-equation model,
by race, are shown below.-56-
Tabulation 8. Simulated Employment Effects for Out-of-School
Male Youth 16-24, Based on Two-Equation Model,
Pooled Years, by Race (see Table 4)
Total White Black
Percent Increase in Employment 3.3 3.2 5.0
if No Minimum
Percent Increase in Employment 2.4 2.3 3 3
if 1973 Minimum ($1.60) Had
Been Maintained
Percent Increase in Employment 2.6 2.5 3 6
if Minimum Had Been $1.25
These estimates indicate that if there had been no minimum, employment
would have been 3.3 percent higher than it was. The comparable estimate
based on the single equation model is 3.9 percent, as shown in Tabulation
5.Recall that the two-equation estimates are based on both wage and
salary workers, whereas the single-equation estimates are based on hourly
wage employees only. Salaried workers on average have attributes asso-
ciated with higher wage rates than hourly workers and thus should be
expected to be affected less by the minimum. The other values in Tabula-
tion 8 are close to the comparable values in Tabulations 5 and 6, based
on single—equation estimates (although Tabulations 5 and 6 do not contain
counterparts to every value in Tabulation 8).
These estimates of course are based in large part on observed employ-
ment outcomes, that were not incorporated in the data used to derive the
single-equation estimates. There is substantial information in the employ-
ment data and they could certainly lead to estimates at variance with the
single-equation results. That they do not again suggests that our results
are not simply determined by the market wage distribution assumptions.
Tabulations 9 through 11 present simulations of employment status by-57-
market wage rate, with and without the minimum wage legislation. These
results cannot be obtained from the single-equation estimates only, because
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83.9 16.1 100.0 (4999)Tabulation 10.Simulated Employment Status by
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Tabulation 11.Simulated Employment Status by
Market Wage Rate, With and Without
the Minimum, Black Men 16—24










































Total 66.6 33.4 100.0 (545)-59-
We shall explain the results in Tabulation 9, for both blacks and whites
together. The separate estimates by race are analogous.
Without the minimum, 10.7 percent of youth with subminimumwage rates
would be without work and 89.2 percent would be employed. With the mini-
mum, 32.5 percent are without work and only 67.5 percent are employed.
(Of this latter group, 32.5 percent are employed withwage rages below
the minimum and 35 percent are employed with wage rates equal to the
minimum.) Total non-employment is increased from 13.3 percent without a
minimum to 16.1 percent with the minimum. Thus not only does the minimum
wage increase non—employment among youth, but it also concentrates non—
employment among youth with the lowest market wage rates.1
The results for white youth are quite close to the results for both
races together because a large majority of youth are white. The estimates
for black youth are similar in direction, but the proportion notemployed is
higher both with and without the minimum. Among black youth with market
wage rates below the minimum, non-employment is increased from 25.3 percent
withoutthe minimum to 434 percent with the minimum, according to these
estimates.
Apossibly anomalous result is that the non-employment rate without
the minimum is shown as lower forpersons with sub-minimum than for those
with above-minimum market wage rates. This results fromassuming the esti-
mated correlation coefficient which is negative, althoughvery imprecisely
measured and not significantly different from zero byany reasonable crite-
rion. Thus this aspect of the simulations should not be given muchcre—
1.Our model specification of courseprescribes that any employment
effect be on this group but it does allowno employment effect at all.-60-
dence.
V.Conclusions
We have estimated the employment and earnings effects of the minimum
wage by parameterizing a hypothesized relationship between underlying
market employment and wage relationships versus observed wage and employment
distributions in the presence of a legislated minimum.
If there had been no minimum during the 1973-78 period, we estimate
that employment among out-of-school men 16 to 24 would have been approxi-
mately 4 percent higher than it in fact was. Among young men 16 to 19
employment would have been about 7 percent higher and among those 20 to 24
2 percent higher. Employment among black youth 16 to 24 would have been
almost 6 percent higher than it was, as compared with somewhat less than
4 percent for white youth. Thus the proportional employment effects of
the minimum are greater for the younger than for older youth and are
greater for black than for white youth.
The aggregate effect on employment, however, depends not only on
the proportion of each group without work because of the minimum, but
also on the number of youth in each group who were employed. For example,
there are about 10 times as many out-of-school youth 20 to 24 as 16 to 17.
Thus if the potential employment increase is 2.2 percent for 20 to 24 year
olds and 8.7 percent for those 16 to 17, elimination of the minimum would
add to the employment roles about two and one-half tines as many youth 20 to 24
1.An alternative would be to base the simulations on an assumed
correlation of zero, which would have produced a non-employment rate for
sub-minimum workers higher than for the above minimum group, if there
were no minimum. See, for example, the two-equation estimates for 1978
presented in Meyer and Wise [1981].-61-
as 16 to 17. Our estimates apply to out-of-school youth, however, and
most young persons 16 to 17 are in school. Nonetheless, it is clear that
the desirability of a youth minimum, for example, depends on the goals
sought through it.If aggregate employment increase were the goal, more
could be gained by reducing the minimum for older than for younger youth.
Indeed, if the minimum were reduced for all, the majority of the gain
could come from the older group.
Although it is sometimes argued that the adverse employment effects
of the minimum are offset by increased earnings, we find virtually no
earnings effect. Even though some youth with market wage rates below
the minimum are paid the legislated minimum, the increased earnings of
these youth is offset by the non-employment and thus zero earnings of
others. Expected earnings of youth are about the same with the minimum
legislation as they would be without it.
Had the minimum not been raised over the 1973-78 period, inflation
would have greatly moderated the adverse employment effects of the minimum,
According to our estimates, if the minimum had remained at its 1973 level,
approximately two-thirds of the potential employment gains from elimina-
tion of the minimum would have been attained.
Our statistical procedure emphasizes the effect of the minimum on
youth who otherwise would be employed at subminimum market wage rates.
But we have also allowed for estimation of possible upward shifts in all
youth wage rates with increases in the minimum. The weight of the evidence
provided by our estimates, however, is inconsistent with a general increase
in youth wage rates with increases in the real minimum. Thusour findings
support the hypothesis that the effects of the minimum are indeed concen--62-
trated on youth with sub-minimum market wage rates. We find no evidence
that the wage rates of youth with market rates above the minimum are bid
up. Although we cannot identify an effect of the minimum on youth 16 to
24 with above-minimum market wage rates, our evidence does not strictly
speaking rule out an increase in the employment of older workers with
increases in the minimum.
A concomitant of our procedure is estimation of market wage and
employment functions. In particular, we are able to estimate the trend
in youth wage rates corrected for the disemployment effects of the minimum.
The average of wage rates among employed youth show white youth wages
falling relative to adult wages between 1967 and 1977 but show no decline
for black youth. We find, however, that market wage rates of blacks as
well as whites were falling over the period of our analysis. Apparently
the greater diseniployment effect of the minimum on black youth made it
appear as though their wage rates were not falling, whereas in fact low
wage black youth were disproportionately without work. Thus their market
wage rates were not incorporated in the averages of observed wage rates.-63-
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